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TAX LAW-THE TAXATION OF DAMAGES RECEIVED IN AN Ac­
TION FOR DEFAMATION: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INJURY TO 
PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION AND INJURY TO PERSONAL REPUTA­
TION-Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As a matter of legislative grace, Congress has excluded from in­
come "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agree­
ment) on account of personal injuries or sickness."! This seemingly 
unambiguous exclusion has produced considerable confusion2 in deter­
mining the scope of section 104(a)(2), specifically with respect to "per­
sonal injuries." What injuries are encompassed by this phrase is not 
entirely clear since neither statutes nor cases provide any definition of 
"personal injuries."3 The major difficulty in this area is in distinguish­
ing between "personal injuries" and "business injuries." The distinc­
tion becomes clouded when an individual, defamed in hislher 
professional capacity, suffers injury to both his/her personal and pro­
fessional reputation. When in such circumstances an action is brought 
under the state's defamation statute, it must be determined, for tax 
purposes, whether the damages received were for "personal injuries." 
Two alternative approaches to this problem were recently set forth by 
I. 1.R.c. § 104(a)(2)(West 1984). Congress exercised its discretion to exclude such 
payments from income on the assumption that they would otherwise be includible in in­
come. The validity of the assumption, however, with respect to damages for defamation of 
character, was not totally beyond question until the advent of Commissioner v. Glenshaw 
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). Prior to Glenshaw, the Service had ruled that damages for 
defamation of character did not constitute income. See Sol. Op. 132, I-I C.B. 92 (1922). 
The Service based its ruling on the fact that such damages did not come within the then­
prevailing definition of income under Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). The Court 
there had defined income as the "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com­
bined." Id. at 207. The Service reasoned that since damages for defamation of character 
did not derive from capital or labor they were not income. 
Thirty-five years later, the Court revised the definition of income in Commissioner v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), in which the Court defined income as an "unde­
niable accession to wealth." Id. at 431. Damages for defamation of character would clearly 
constitute income under the Glenshaw definition, thus making the Service's prior ruling of 
questionable validity. 
2. Confusion in the area of personal injury recoveries has been academically recog­
nized and has been the subject of much scholarly debate. See. e.g .• Comment, Income Tax 
Effects on Personal Injury Recoveries, 30 LA. L. REV. 672 (1970). 
3. Id. at 675. 
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the Tax Court4 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals5 in Roemer v. 
Commissioner. 
II. FACTS OF ROEMER 
The taxpayer, a licensed insurance broker, came before the court 
to resolve a dispute over the tax liability of damages he received6 in a 
libel suit against the Retail Credit Company.7 Roemer had been an 
insurance broker since 1941 and in the 1960's began doing business as 
Paul F. Roemer, Jr., Inc. Over the years, he had established an excel­
lent reputation, both professionally and personally.8 When the tax­
payer applied in 1965 for a license to sell life insurance,9 Retail Credit 
Company sent a grossly defamatory credit report to the reviewing 
company and other insurance companies. lo In substance, it falsely 
stated that Roemer was incompetent in his business I I and questioned 
his honesty.12 Consequently, he could not obtain a license. In addi­
tion, it impinged his reputation in the community where he both 
worked and resided, as "most of his clients were also his friends." \3 
As a result, Roemer sued under California libellaw,14 alleging damage 
to his reputation as a broker and loss of insurance business and prof­
its. 15 An amended complaint in 1967 alleged that his business de­
4. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.e. 398 (1982). 
5. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). 
6. The term" 'damages received'. . . means an amount received. . . through pros­
ecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement 
agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution." Treas. Reg. § 1.l04-1(c) (1956). 
7. The state appeals court found that Retail Credit was "in the business of providing 
commercial investigative reports to subscribers-many of whom are insurance underwrit­
ers who request such reports in determining whether to license applicant brokers with their 
companies." Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 930, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 84 
(1975). 
8. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 694. 
9. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 398. 
10. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 695. Retail Credit Co. prepared the report at the request of 
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, the reviewing company. Id. 
11. Id. The report accused Roemer of neglecting his clients' affairs and wrongly 
stated that he had recently been fired from an insurance firm. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. Roemer proceeded under section 45 of the California Civil Code which 
provides: 
Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or 
other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, con­
tempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or 
which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982). 
15. Roemer, 79 T.e. at 401. 
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pended upon his professional reputation, credit standing, and high 
standard of fiscal responsibility.16 He further asserted that the report 
was published with the intent to damage his reputation, as well as to 
injure him in his business, profession, and occupation.17 As to the 
evidence presented in the state court libel suit, the Tax Court found 
that Roemer's case was centered upon showing the business aspects of 
the alleged IOSS.18 The jury awarded compensatory damages of 
$40,000 and punitive damages of $250,000,19 without designating the 
business and personal elements of the loss. Roemer argued before the 
Tax Court that since the injury consisted of inseparable amounts of 
damage to both business and personal reputation, the entire award 
should be excludable under section 104(a)(2).20 The court concluded 
that damages received in a libel suit for injured reputation are excluda­
ble only if the defamation results in injury to personal reputation, as 
opposed to business reputation. 21 Finding that the "predominant na­
ture of [the taxpayer's] claims involved damages to his business ... 
reputation,"22 the court held that the compensatory damages were not 
on account of a personal injury and hence not excludable under sec­
tion 104(a)(2).23 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that since defa­
mation under California law is a personal injury,24 the damages 
16. [d. The complaint also stated that the taxpayer "enjoyed a good name and busi­
ness reputation, both generally and in particular with respect to high standards of business, 
... honesty, integrity, [and] financial responsibility" and that the continued success of his 
business was dependent on these attributes. [d. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. at 401-02 (stating that "little, if anything, was said about how [the report] 
affected his personal affairs. The evidence presented. . . was primarily directed at how the 
[taxpayer's] business relationships and planned business ventures were harmed by the false 
report of Retail Credit.") Notably, the court of appeals remained virtually silent as to the 
substance of the trial. The court did, however, relate that the jury was instructed that in 
assessing damages, it could consider any emotional suffering endured by Roemer, as well as 
his social status in the community. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 695. 
19. Roemer, 79 T.e. at 403. The appropriate tax consequences of a punitive damage 
award in an action such as Roemer's exceeds the scope of this paper. 
20. [d. at 405. 
21. [d. at 405-06. 
22. [d. at 406. 
23. [d. at 407. 
24. The court found significant "the fact that the California defamation statutes ap­
pear in the Civil Code at 'Division 1. Persons. Part 2. Personal Rights.' " Roemer, 716 F.2d 
at 699. It also emphasized that in the introductory statute to Part 2, "a general personal 
right to be protected from defamation" was recognized. [d. Hence, the court concluded 
that defamation constituted a personal injury under California law. [d. at 700. 
While defamation was so characterized, the related action of disparagement or trade 
libel was considered, not as a personal injury, but as "an attack on the quality of the plain­
tift's products or services." [d. at 699. Under the Ninth Circuit's rationale, if Roemer had 
brought an action for disparagement, any damages he recovered would not have been ex­
82 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:79 
received by Roemer in his defamation action were on account of a 
personal injury.25 
III. DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF I.R.C. SECTION 104(a)(2) 
This paper will attempt to define the proper scope of the term 
"personal injuries" within the meaning of I.R.C. section 104(a)(2). 
Specifically addressed will be whether a state's characterization of def­
amation as a "personal injury" should compel the application of sec­
tion 104(a)(2). Also considered will be whether, given the 
inapplicability of state law, a distinction should be drawn between 
business reputation and personal reputation within a single defamation 
action.26 
In determining whether a damage award is within the ambit of 
section I04(a)(2), it is appropriate to proceed according to the gui­
dance provided by the Supreme Court.27 In recognition of this direc­
tive and as a broad framework for analysis, this paper will progress 
upon the premise that "[t]he income taxed ... should be broadly con­
strued in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax comprehensively. 
The exemptions, on the other hand, are specifically stated and should 
c1udable under section 104(a)(2) since the state did not characterize disparagement as a 
"personal injury." See id. at 699-700. 
25. Id. at 700. The opposing conclusions reached by the Tax Court and the Ninth 
Circuit result from differing approaches to the problem. While both courts attempted to 
ascertain the nature or character of the claims litigated, see Roemer, 79 T.e. at 405; Roe­
mer, 716 F.2d at 697, each proceeded from there with a different mode of analysis. In 
answering the commutual question, the Tax Court looked to the allegations in the com­
plaints and the issues and evidence in the libel suit. Roemer, 79 T.e. at 406. The Ninth 
Circuit on the other hand consulted state law characterizations of defamation in determin­
ing "the nature of the claims litigated." Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697. 
26. This was essentially the "threshold question" addressed by the Tax Court in Roe­
mer. 79 T.C. at 405. After holding that such a distinction should be made, the court 
proceeded to examine the allegations and evidence in the libel suit, id. at 405-06, in order to 
estimate the portion of the award given for injured business reputation since this portion 
would not be excludable under section 104(a)(2). 
The Ninth Circuit unnecessarily concerned itself with the business/personal distinc­
tion since, under California law, any damages received in a defamation action would, by 
definition, be on account of personal injuries. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
27. See Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1023 (1927) (stating that "[t]he 
consideration of the question whether damages received for libel and slander are taxable as 
income must proceed. . . according to such decisions of the Supreme Court as mark the 
course.") 
Although never squarely addressing the issues under discussion, the Supreme Court 
has provided tangential guidance which should serve to "mark the course" for analysis. 
An examination of this "course" is particularly appropriate in the area of taxation since 
"the decisions relating to income tax law contain charts rather than definitions." Commis­
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 348 
U.S. 426 (1955). 
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be construed with restraint in light of the same policy."28 In recogni­
tion of this guiding principle, lower courts have required a taxpayer to 
"bring himself squarely within the [section 104(a)(2)] exemption from 
tax"29 in order to benefit from the exclusion. 
A. 	 The Role of State Law Definitions of Personal Injury in 
Applying Section 104(a)(2) 
The applicability of a federal statute is generally presumed not to 
be dependent upon state law.30 The presumption applies with equal if 
not more compelling force to a federal taxing statute.3! In terms of 
clarifying when state law should apply, however, the latter situation 
falls within its own analytical construct. 32 
A firmly grounded principle holds "that in the interpretation of 
the words used in a federal revenue act, local law is not controlling 
unless the federal statute by 'express language or necessary implica­
tion, makes its own operation dependent upon state law.' "33 The ap­
propriate application of the precept, however, is far from clear. 
Interestingly, while the Supreme Court has repeatedly grappled with 
the problem,34 the Ninth Circuit in Roemer simply ignored it, summa­
rily stating that "[s]ince there is no general federal common law of 
torts [citing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins] nor controlling definitions 
[of personal injury] in the tax code, we must look to state law."35 
In its concession to what state law regards as a "personal injury," 
the court's reliance on Erie is misplaced. While there is no federal 
common law of torts, it is of little importance in the instant case. We 
are here attempting to construe the term "personal injuries" within 
28. 	 Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28,49 (1949). 
29. Agar v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. 116, 119 (1960), affd, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 
1961). See also Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920,925 (E.D. Tenn. 1959) (stating 
that the taxpayer has "the burden of proving that . . . the payment comes clearly within 
one of the stated exemption.") 
30. 	 Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943). 
31. See, e.g. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). 
32. Both the Supreme Court and the commentators have analytically addressed the 
applicability of state law to federal revenue statutes in a categoric manner. See, e.g., Heiner 
v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 279 (1938); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940); 
Annot., 140 A.L.R. 717, 721 (1942); see also Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 
YALE L.J. 799 (1943); Scharf, State law in the Tax Court-Controlling Precedents, 26 TAX 
LAW. 293 (Winter 1973). 
33. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 279 (1938) (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 
103, 110 (1932». 
34. See, e.g .. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942); United States v. Pelzer, 312 
U.S. 399 (1941); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); Heiner v. Mellon 304 U.S. 271 
(1938). 
35. 	 Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697 (emphasis added). 
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the meaning of a federal revenue act, not the tort of defamation. 
When a federal statue is under scrutiny, the Erie doctrine should not 
apply.36 The Supreme Court itself has recognized this limitation of 
Erie37 and has called upon federal courts to establish "federal common 
law" when legislation is silent as to whose law should govern. 38 The 
need for such a body of law is particularly compelling when one deals 
with an integrated body of federal legislation such as the Internal Rev­
enue Code.39 In light of the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit's refusal to 
create or even consult federal decisional law regarding section 
104(a)(2) represents an abdication of its "basic responsibility."40 
The fact that no "controlling definitions in the tax code"41 existed 
similarly provides insufficient ground for deferring to state law. On 
several occasions the Supreme Court has found that the absence of a 
tax code definition of a term in question does not compel application 
36. Erie merely "established the now familiar maxim that a federal court must look 
to the law of the state in which it sits to decide issues ofpurely local law. " Sharf, State Law 
in the Tax Court-Controlling Precedents, 26 TAX LAW. 293, 293 (Winter 1973) (emphasis 
added). 
37. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592 (1973) (stat­
ing that "[s]ince Erie, and as a corollary of that decision, we have consistently acted on the 
assumption that dealings which may be 'ordinary' or 'local' as between private citizens 
raise serious questions of national sovereignty when they arise in the context of a specific 
constitutional or statutory provision.") 
The limits of Erie have also been academically recognized. See, e.g., Annot., 140 
A.L.R. 	717, 718 (1942). The annotation read Erie as the Court did in Little Lake: 
[T]he decision in the Tompkins Case was not that Federal courts should follow 
state laws or decisions in all cases, but that they should follow non-statutory gen­
eral law of a state equally with statutory law or constructions of statutory law. 
This, of course, left untouched that large field, covering Federal questions, such 
as questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, in 
which Federal courts have always been free and are now free to ignore state laws. 
Id. 
38. 	 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973). In con­
struing the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, the Court stated: 
[There is] no provision of the. . . Act [ that] guides us to choose state or federal 
law. . . . But silence on that score in federal legislation is no reason for limiting 
the reach of federal law .... To the contrary, the inevitable incompleteness 
presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic 
responsibility of the federal courts. 
Id. This directive for the creation of federal common law, however, is limited to certain 
areas. Specifically, courts find it to exist "only in such narrow areas as those concerned 
with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes 
implicating the conflicting rights of State or our relations with foreign nations, and admi­
ralty cases." Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). 
39. See Sharf, supra note 32 at 293 (stating "it has become firmly established that a 
comprehensive body of federal legislation may warrant the creation of 'federal common 
law' to fill large gaps in a statutory scheme.") 
40. 	 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
41. 	 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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of state law.42 In such a case, a court must simply "look to the pur­
pose of the statute to ascertain what is intended,"43 rather than cava­
lierly to defer to state law. 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's summary treatment of the state law 
issue is judicially remiss: More importantly, however, it is danger­
ously misleading as legal precedent. The appropriate analysis, rather, 
should begin by determining whether the statute expressly or by "nec­
essary implication, makes its . . . operation dependent upon state 
law."44 A survey of the cases applying this principle should provide a 
general idea as to when state law governs. 
The seminal case is Burnet v. Harmel. 45 In attempting to receive 
capital gains treatment, the taxpayer in Burnet argued that the execu­
tion of certain oil and gas leases in return for a bonus payment and 
stipulated royalties constituted a sale of capital assets.46 He based his 
argument on the fact that Texas law regarded such leases as sale of oil 
and gas in place.47 The Court held that the capital gains statute48 
neither said nor implied state law controlled and reasoned that while 
"state law creates legal interests, . . . the federal statute determines 
. . . how they shall be taxed. "49 The Court next looked to the partic­
ular characteristics which Texas law gave to the leases and determined 
42. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). 
The Court in Morgan addressed, for tax purposes, whether a decedent had passed a 
general or special power of appointment under her will. The resolution was necessary since 
a then-existing Internal Revenue Code section included in the grosss estate the value of 
property "passing under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent by 
will...." ld. at 79 n.1 (quoting 26 U.S.c. § 411). The estate argued that the state of 
Wisconsin (the decedent's state of residence and the state under which the will was pro­
bated) defined the decedent's interest as a special power of appointment and hence when 
the property passed upon exercise of the power of appointment the property should not be 
included in the estate. ld. at 80. While the Court expressly noted that "[n]one of the 
revenue acts [had] defined the phrase 'general power of appointment: " it ultimately held 
state law inapplicable. After consulting two treatises on powers, id. at 81 n.6, and the 
legislative history, id. at 81, the Court concluded that the decedent's powers were general 
within the meaning of the federal revenue act. ld. at 80. See a/so United States v. Pelzer, 
312 U.S. 399,403 (1941). 
43. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. at 403. An examination of the purpose of sec­
tion 104(a)(2) and a determination as to whether Roemer's damage award fits within it is 
addressed in Part B of this paper. See infra notes 71-97 and accompanying text. The 
Court's command to look to the purpose of the statute here merely demonstrates the defi­
ciency in the Ninth Circuit's analysis. 
44. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
45. 287 U.S. 103 (1932). 
46. ld. at 109. 
47. ld. 
48. The statute afforded capital gains treatment to "gain from the sale. . . of capital 
assets." ld. at 11 O. 
49. ld. 
86 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:79 
that those characteristics, whatever they were termed under state law, 
were not within the intendment of the capital gains statute. 50 
A situation in which the court held that state law controlled oc­
curred in Helvering v. Stuart. 51 There, the taxpayer served with other 
appointed trustees as a trustee of trusts which he had created. 52 The 
Commissioner sought to attribute the net income of the trusts to the 
taxpayer-grantor under Sections 166 and 167 of the Revenue Act of 
1934.53 These sections essentially provided that where a person "not 
having a substantial adverse interest in the dis post ion of . . . the 
corpus" possesses the power to invest in the grantor title to the corpus, 
the net income of the corpus will be charged to the grantor. 54 The 
initial question was whether state law would control in determining if 
the other trustees had the proscribed power. 55 The Court held that 
since the tax hinged upon the revesting of property, the "necessary 
implication" was that the possibility was to be determined by state 
law. 56 It reasoned that Congress had designated an event, the revest­
ing of property, which could only occur by operation of state law. 57 In 
other words, if the event upon which the tax section operates depends 
for its creation on state law, the "necessay implication" is that state 
law applies. 58 
The more recent case of United States v. Mitche1l59 further bears 
out this interpretation. In Mitchell, the taxpayer and her husband re­
sided in a community property state, which attributed one-half of the 
income of the community to each spouse regardless of who earned the 
50. Id. at 11 0-11. 
51. 317 U.S. 154 (1942). 
52. Id. at 156-57. 
53. Id. at 161. 
54. Id. at 159-60. 
55. Id. at 161. 
56. Id. 
57. The Court stated that "[w]hether that event mayor may not occur depends upon 
the interpretation placed upon the instrument by state law." Id. at 162. 
58. The Burnet case provides an instructive contrast. See supra notes 46-47 and ac­
companying text. The taxable event there was the sale or exchange of a capital asset. 
Although the state considered the oil lease a sale of the oil in place, the occurrence of the 
"sale" Congress contemplated could be ascertained without reference to state law. Con­
gress intended a certain type of transaction, which it called a "sale," to be subject to capital 
gains treatment. Since Congress had its own criteria as to what constituted a "sale," the 
Court in Burnet could look to the substance of the oil lease to determine if it fell within 
Congressional concern. The same could not be done in Stuart. The triggering event there 
was the power to revest property to the grantor. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
Although the Court could look independently of state law to the essential powers the other 
trustees held, the revesting of property could only take place when the state held those 
powers to be sufficient for such an event. Stuart, 317 U.S. at 161. 
59. 403 U.S. 190 (1971). 
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income. In anticipation of divorce, the taxpayer renounced her com­
munity under state law, which had the effect of relieving her of "debts 
contracted during marriage. "60 After discovering that the husband 
had failed to file tax returns in past years, the Commissioner assessed 
deficiencies against the taxpayer based upon half the community in­
come.61 The Court initially confronted sections 1 and 3 of the 1954 
Code, which imposed a tax on the taxable income "of every individ­
ual."62 The Court essentially held that since "of' denoted owner­
ship,63 it must look to state law to determine, who, in fact, owned the 
income.64 Since the state had designated each spouse as the one-half 
owner of all income, each would be taxed as such.65 
Although the Court did not expressly state that the operation of 
section 3 necessarily depended upon state law, that inference can be 
drawn.66 The event which Congress fixed for taxation, i.e., the owner­
ship of income, would or would not occur depending upon the effect of 
state law. In the words of the Burnet Court, therefore, the "necessary 
implication" of this revenue section "makes its own operation depen­
dent upon state law."67 
It follows from the teachings of the cited cases that state law 
should not determine the tax treatment of Roemer's damage award. 
As the courts have repeatedly stated, "state law creates legal interests 
and rights, ... [while] the federal law designates which of these inter­
ests and rights shall be taxed. "68 In making the designation, further­
more, the federal law will determine that state law applies only when 
the tax section depends for its operation upon state law either ex­
pressly or by necessary implication.69 
Application of the above principles leads to several findings. It 
must initially be noted that the state of California has created a legal 
right to be free from defamation, a right it considers "personal."70 
60. Id. at 191. 
61. Id. at 192. 
62. Id. at 194 (quoting I.R.C. § 3 (West 1982». 
63. Id. at 194-95 (quoting Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 109 (1930». 
64. Id. at 195-97. 
65. Id. at 196. 
66. The Court expressly mentioned several of the pioneer decisions dealing with this 
principle and cited both Burnet and Stuart, leaving the inference of the precedentia1 vitality 
of those cases. Id. at 197. 
67. Burnet, 297 U.S. at 110. 
68. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1959) (citing 
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940); He\vering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154,162 
(1942». 
69. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
70. See supra note 24. 
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Federal law, therefore, should determine the federal tax status of this 
state-created right7l unless the event which triggers the exemption can 
only occur by operation of state law. The crucial event under section 
104(a)(2) is the personal injury,72 the occurrence of which cannot de­
pend upon state law.73 Granted, certain injuries may be characterized 
as "personal" under state law, but to permit such classifications to 
control federal tax consequences would promote form over 
substance.74 
In sum, the wholesale deference to state law in Roemer was mis­
founded. The true nature of a claim cannot be determined, for tax 
purposes, by the semantical characterizations of state law. In an ap­
propriate case there are cogent reasons for separating the business and 
personal aspects of a claim for defamation. 
B. 	 Damage to Reputation as a Personal Injury: The Need to 
Distinguish Between Business and Personal Reputation. 
In determining whether a damage award was "on account of per­
sonal injuries" and hence squarely within section 104(a)(2), the courts 
consistently looked to the nature of the claims in the original suit.75 In 
a slightly different context, the Supreme Court examined the nature of 
the claim in the original suit for purposes of clarifying the business/ 
personal dichotomy.76 Specifically, the Court held that the designa­
tion of an expense as "business" or "personal" depends on "the origin 
71. The actual state-created right is the right to bring an action for defamation, 
which stems from the right to be protected from defamation. We are here evaluating the 
tax status of damages received in vindication of this right. 
72. Although section 104(a)(2) exludes the "damages received" for personal injuries, 
such damages merely measure the extent of the personal injury. 
73. Such an event will obviously depend upon the potential tort-feasor and any dam­
aging consequences flowing from the wrongful act. 
74. Courts must be particularly careful in the income tax area to give force to sub­
stance as opposed to form. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,206 (1920) (stating that 
it is "essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income', . . . and to apply 
the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form.") 
75. See, e.g., Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912, 913 (6th 
Cir. 1932) (stating that "[t]he fund involved must be considered in light of the claim from 
which it is realized and which is reflected in the petition filed [in the original suit]"); State 
Fish Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.e. 465, 474 (1967); Telefilm, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 
T.e. 688, 693 (1954). 
76. See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). The Court there faced the 
issue of the deductibility under section 23(a)(2) (current version of I.R.e. § 212(2) (West 
1982» of legal expenses incurred by the taxpayer in divorce proceedings. Upon successful 
defense against his wife's claims to certain of his properties, the taxpayer claimed his legal 
expenses were incurred for conservation of property held for the production of income and 
hence deductible under § 23(a)(2) (current version at I.R.e. § 212(2) (West 1982» Gil­
more, 372 U.S. at 42-43. The Court, noting that the only expenses deductible under that 
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and character of the claim. "77 In determining such "origin and char­
acter," the Court looked to the context in which the claim arose and 
characterized the expense as a business expense if the claim arose in 
that context. 78 
Although the characterization according to whence the claim 
arose developed to determine the proper treatment of an expense,79 it 
does serve to "mark the course"80 of analysis for treatment of defama­
tion damages. 81 Its application to section 104(a)(2) indicates that 
damages received by a taxpayer will not be considered "on account of 
personal injuries"82 if the taxpayer's claim arose in connection with 
hislher business.83 A damage award for injury to business reputation 
would thus be outside the scope of section 104(a)(2).84 
The distinction posed is further justified in theory. The Supreme 
section are those with a business purpose, narrowed the issue to whether the expense was 
business or personal in nature. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 46. 
77. [d. at 49. 
78. "[T]he characterization, as 'business' or 'personal', of the litigation costs of re­
sisting a claim depends on whether or not the claim arises in connection with the taxpayer's 
profit-seeking activities." [d. at 48 (emphasis added). 
79. The issue in Gilmore was deductibility of an expense under what is now section 
212(2). See supra note 76. 
80. See supra note 27. 
81. "The Internal Revenue Code. . . is to be construed as a whole and not as if each 
of its provisions were independent of the others. Other pertinent provisions in the Code 
may be consulted to determine the true meaning of the pertinent language in section 
22(b)(5) (current version at I.R.C. § 104 (West 1982»" Townsend v. United States, 143 F. 
Supp. 150, 153 (S.D. III. 1956). 
The construction of section 23(a)(2) (current version at I.R.C. § 212(2) (West 1982» is 
being used here merely to ascertain "the true meaning of the pertinent language in section 
22(b)(5) [current version at I.R.C. Sec. 104 (West 1982)]." [d. 
82. 1.R.c. § 104(a)(2) (West 1982). 
83. The test in Gilmore does not have direct application to section 104(a)(2). It does, 
however, offer a guidepost to determine that section's meaning. The suggested analysis 
does not have absolute application. For example, a taxpayer who loses his/her leg while 
working in hislher construction business has a claim which arose in connection with his/ 
her business. According to the analysis of this note, the taxpayer would not have sustained 
a personal injury within the meaning of section I04(a)(2), yet these types of injuries are 
clearly personal and within the scope of that section. This anomalous result is explained on 
the basis that the Gilmore test would not apply to physical injuries, which are clearly 
personal. 
84. A strict application of the proposed test to injury to reputation could produce 
seemingly incongruous results. Suppose a taxpayer suffers injury to both his/her business 
and personal reputation after being defamed in a purely personal setting. Any claim for 
damage to either personal or business reputation would appear to have arisen in connection 
with the taxpayer's personal life and section 104(a)(2) would govern the taxability of any 
damage award. A closer inspection, however, reveals that although the claim for damage 
to business reputation was the result of defamation in a personal setting, the claim could 
not have arisen until the damage was felt in the taxpayer's buiness. Hence the claim arose 
in connection with his/her business. 
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Court has intimated that the exclusion of personal injury recoveries 
from income rests "on the theory that they roughly correspond to a 
return of capital."85 The lower courts generally have accepted the the­
ory.86 As for the taxation of capital, an equally recognized theory 
holds that a taxpayer must prove a cost or other basis of the applicable 
capital asset since recovery of an amount in excess of that amount 
constitutes income.87 
If a personal injury recovery be considered a return of capital, 
theoretically the taxpayer should demonstrate his/her basis in the as­
set damaged, his/her "personal capital." Yet taxpayers receiving 
damages on account of personal injuries receive a carte blanche exclu­
sion from income, without having to prove any basis. An explanation 
of the theoretical inconsistency lies in recognizing the difficulty in as­
signing a basis to "personal capital. "88 This is especially true with 
respect to personal reputation, an "asset" of a most intangible nature. 
In recognition of this difficult if not impossible valuation problem, sec­
tion 104(a)(2) totally excludes from income any damages received 
from personal injuries. 89 
The valuation impediment, however, does not exist with respect 
to business reputation. The courts generally regard business reputation 
as tantamount to good will, which is normally assigned a basis.90 
Although such assets are intangible, they may be more readily valued 
than personal assets such as personal reputation. For this reason, 
damages for injury to business reputation should not fall within the 
85. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955). 
86. See Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating that 
"(d)amages paid for personal injuries are excluded from gross income because they make 
the taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights-because, in effect, they restore 
a loss to capital"); See also Meyer v. United States, 173 F.Supp. 920, 924 (E.D. Tenn. 
1959). 
87. Cullins v. Commissioner, 24 T.e. 322, 328 (1955). See also Raytheon Produc­
tion Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1944); Yorio, The Taxation of 
Damages Tax: and Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 701,702 (1977). 
88. Such difficulty has been expressly recognized. Raytheon Production Corp. v. 
Commissioner 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1944); Cullins v. Commissioner, 24 T.e. 322, 
328 (1955). 
89. The contention holds that section 104(a)(2) excludes the full amount of any "per­
sonal" capital returned to the taxpyer in the form of damages received. The section allows 
the exclusion instead of forcing the taxpayer to prove a basis in his "personal asset" and 
then taxing him on the excess of the "personal capital" returned over the basis in the 
"personal asset." 
90. See Wallace v. Commissioner, 35 T.e.M. 954, 959 (1976) (stating that "insofar 
as the. . . proceeds were for injury to. . . business reputation, they would be analogous to 
a loss of good will, a capital asset.") See also State Fish Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.e. 
465, 476 (1967) (stating that "it is obvious that petitioner's complaint had alleged. 
damage to reputation (goodwill)"). 
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section 104 exclusion. When it is possible to value an asset's basis so as 
to tax the excess of a damage recovery over basis, tax law should do 
so. This merely follows the fundamental premise that Congress in­
tended "to exert in this field the full measure of its taxing power."91 
The forgoing analysis takes into consideration that in many cases 
establishing a basis in a business asset such as reputation will be just as 
elusive as doing so for personal reputation.92 When the basis in the 
damaged business asset cannot be established, however, the courts uni­
formly hold the proceeds of any damage recovery to be taxable in 
full. 93 Although the cases so holding have dealt with valuations to 
good will, the fact that business reputation has been analogized to 
good will94 justifies its similar treatment. 
Defamation of business reputation has long been treated as a dis­
tinct injury, apart from injury to personal reputation.95 A problem 
arises, however, when the defamation reflects upon a taxpayer's per­
sonal reputation as well as his/her business reputation.96 In such a 
case, the courts, for tax purposes, look to the taxpayer's primary pur­
pose in bringing the original defamation action.97 The pivotal ques­
tion is whether "the primary purpose to [the] litigation [was] to 
vindicate the personal reputation and character of [the] taxpayer."98 
91. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (\ 955). 
92. See also Telefilm, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 688, 695-96 (\954) (taxpayer 
could not establish a basis in the business asset which was damaged). See also Cullin v. 
Commissioner, 24 T.e. 322, 328 (1955) (taxpayer could not establish the value of any busi­
ness asset which was allegedly 10st.). 
93. See also Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st 
Cir. 1944) (the court, finding the record "devoid of evidence ... of the basis of the busi­
ness and good will," held the entire damage recovery taxable); Telefilm, Inc. v. Commis­
sioner, 21 T.C. 688, 685-96 (1954) (damage recovery for the destruction of busness and 
good will held fully taxable since taxpayer could not show cost or other basis). 
94. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
95. See Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 116, 120 (1981) (stating that "payments for 
injury to professional reputation are not excludable from gross income, since any damages 
alleged to have been paid as a result of such injury would not fall within the exlusion 
afforded payments for injuries to personal reputation"); See also Agar v. Commissioner, 19 
T.C.M. 116, 119 (\960) (stating that "damages ... paid ... would not fall within the 
exemption from tax afforded payments for injuries to personal reputation. Rather, they 
would more properly be characterized as payments made in satisfaction of injuries to ... 
business reputation"), ajJ'd, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961); Wallace v. Commissioner, 35 
T.e.M. 954, 959 (1976) (distinguishing between personal reputation and business reputa­
tion for exclusionary purposes). 
96. The principal case supplies an especially evident example. Statements that an 
individual is dishonest and incompetent in his business will undoubtedly reflect on that 
individual's personal reputation. 
97. See, e.g. Draper v. Commissioner, 26 T.e. 201, 204 (1956). 
98. [d. An affirmative answer will result in any damage recovery being held non­
taxable. 
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The answer may be ascertained by examining "the claims made in the 
. . . complaint filed in the prior action and the issues and evidence 
there presented to the jury."99 Although a particular defamatory inci­
dent may injure a taxpayer in both his/her business and personal ca­
pacities, the taxpayer can never receive "damages . . . on account of 
personal injuries"loo if he/she neither alleges nor presents evidence of 
damage to his/her personal reputation. 101 Further, he/she should not 
subsequently be heard to claim that the suit was brought for damage 
to his/her personal reputation, a claim that may be a "tax-motivated 
afterthought."102 Hence, when the nature of the defamation affects 
both business and personal reputations, the "primary purpose" test 
enables a court to determine whether damages resulted from injury to 
personal reputation or to business reputation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although state law may characterize defamation as a "personal 
injury," such a determination should not control the operation of 
I.R.C. Sec. 104(a)(2). That section exempts from income the amount 
of damages recovered for personal injuries. It must operate according 
to federal standards which alone should determine whether a particu­
lar defamatory incident was "personal" in nature. Resort to state law, 
when a tax statute is in question, should only obtain when the statute's 
operation is necessarily dependent upon state law. This situation oc­
99. State Fish Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 465,474 (1967). The court in State 
Fish looked to these factors in determining the nature of recovery, as other courts have 
unanimously done. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1228, 1230 (6th Cir. 
1981) (court looked to complaint); Telefilm, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.e. 688, 693 (1954); 
Cullins v. Commissioner, 24 T. e. 322, 328 (1955). Although no court has expressly held 
that these factors must be utilized in determining a taxpayer's "primary purpose" in bring­
ing a suit, they logically provide the best indication of a taxpayer's purpose. 
100. 1.R.e. § 104(a)(2) (West 1982) (emphasis added). 
101. The principal case provides a prime example. The taxpayer argued that since 
the injury consisted of inseparable amounts of damage to both business and personal repu­
tation, the entire award should be excludable under section 104(a)(2). Roemer, 79 T.C. at 
404. The taxpayer, in effect, sought an inference of injury to his personal reputation, be­
cause "little, if anything, [was said] about how [the report] affected his personal affairs." Id. 
at 401-02. If a party never afforded the jury an opportunity to hear evidence of such injury, 
the jury cannot very well award damages on account of it. 
102. Roemer, 79 T.e. at 410. Courts have been sensitive to such claims in determin­
ing whether an award represents damages received from personal injuries. See, e.g., 
Knuckles v. Commissioner, 23 T.e.M. 182, 185 (1964) (stating that "petitioner's insistence 
upon settlement based on a tort claim for personal injury was an afterthought [based on] 
the possible tax advantages which might result"); O.S.C. Corp. v. Commissioner, 43 
T.e.M. 1430, 1433 (1982) (stating that "the decision to allocate ... the largest part of the 
. . . settlement to damages to reputation was an afterthought" based on favorable tax 
treatment). 
93 1984] TAXATION OF DAMAGES 
curs when the event upon which the tax section is triggered depends 
for its creation on state law. Although California generally considers 
defamation a personal injury, the state cannot create a personal injury, 
which is the crucial event for section 104(a)(2). Federal law alone, 
therefore, should determine whether a single defamatory incident, for 
which damages are recovered, constitutes a personal injury. 
The tax court in Roemer proceeded in this manner, distinguishing 
between injury to business and personal reputation. The distinction is 
a sound one, supported by the broad directives of the Supreme Court 
and firmly grounded in theory. 
The tax consequences of a damage recovery flow from the nature 
of the claims in the original suit. The Supreme Court has indicated 
that the nature or character of a claim will be termed "business" or 
"personal" according to the context in which it arose.103 Injury to 
reputation should not be considered a "personal injury," therefore, if 
the claim arose in connection with the taxpayer's business. Such a 
construction merely follows the precept that exclusions must be read 
narrowly. 
The distinction posed is also justified in theory. Damages for per­
sonal injuries are excluded from income on the basis that they are a 
return of the taxpayer's "personal capital." This unqualified exclusion 
exists in lieu of the normal practice of requiring a taxpayer to prove a 
basis in the asset damaged so as to tax him on the excess of the recov­
ery over basis. The total exclusion recognizes the difficulty of as­
signing a basis to "personal capital." This difficulty, however, does 
not exist with respect to business reputation. As the courts recog­
nized, business reputation is analogous to good will, which is uni­
formly given a basis. 104 Failure to show a basis in good will results in 
the full taxation of any damages recovered for loss of good will. lOS In 
light of the avowed similarity between good will and business reputa­
tion, damages for loss of business reputation should receive similar 
treatment. 
While the bifurcation of reputation into business and personal 
103. See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39,48 (1963). 
104. See Wallace v. Commissioner 35 T.C.M. 954 (1976) (stating that "insofar as the 
. proceeds were for injury to. . . business reputation, they would be analogous to a loss 
of goodwill, a capital asset"). See also State Fish Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 465, 476 
(1967) (stating that "it is obvious that petitioner's complaint had alleged ... damage to 
reputation (goodwill) ...."). See also id. at 466 (taxpayers assigned separate amount of 
money to goodwill in their accounting journal). See also Cullins v. Commissioner, 24 T.e. 
322, 328 (1955) (court requiring taxpayers to show a basis in goodwill). 
105. See Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 
1944). 
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components has strong support, in some cases such an approach may 
impose a harsh burden on the taxpayer. This is particularly evident in 
Roemer. Defining the "personal" portion of a damage award may be a 
difficult task, especially when a particular defamatory incident may 
inextricabaly effect one's personal and professional reputation. More­
over, a taxpayer in the above situation faces a dilemma when he/she 
tries the merits of his/her claim. While his/her business and personal 
reputation may have been inseparably impinged, he/she will most nat­
urally focus on the business aspects of the loss in order to maximize 
the damage award. Yet, in doing so, any damages received would, 
under the proposed approach, not be excludable under section 
104(a)(2). While these harsh realities may be somewhat disconcerting, 
it must be remembered that certain damage awards, which otherwise 
would be income, were legislatively excused from such treatment. As 
a legislative exclusion, section 104(a)(2) must be read narrowly, or, at 
the very minimum, in accord with the cases and theory. It was the 
Tax Court's position in Roemer which gave force to this guideline and 
which should ultimately prevail so as to restore proper tax treatment 
in this area. 
Irve J. Goldman 
